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INTRODUCTION 
The irony of bankruptcy is that within a single bankruptcy 
proceeding there exists a multi-billion dollar market—the claims trading 
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market. 1  At the commencement of a bankruptcy case, creditors find 
themselves in a state of limbo, unsure whether their claims will be paid 
or even allowed.2 Thus, creditors seek to sell their claims at a discount to 
avoid waiting for the bankruptcy process to come to a certain realization 
on the value of their claim.3 By selling their claim, they can avoid a 
delayed or potentially reduced payment.4 Claim traders take on these 
theoretically risky claims, because “they believe that efficient pricing 
will enable them to realize a profit when the claim is paid.”5 However, 
this begs the question—what happens if the transferred claim should 
have been disallowed in the hands of the original claimants?6 Few courts 
have attempted to answer this daunting question but even those that 
have, leave unanswered questions about the future of claims trading.7 
In a recent case, In re KB Toys, the Third Circuit held trade claims 
that would have been disallowed in the hands of the original claimants, 
would also be disallowed in the hands of the transferees.8 In contrast, In 
re Enron held disabilities are specific to each claimant and do not follow 
from the original claimant to the transferee unless the claim was 
transferred via assignment.9 
While the Court’s ruling in KB Toys applied narrowly to trade 
claims 10  and Enron did not indicate how its analysis would treat 
different types of claims,11 this could be the first step in changing the 
market of claims trading.12 The scope of unanswered questions in the 
wake of this evolution includes the fate of bank claims and publically 
traded debt.13  This note will principally discuss the evolution of the 
claims trading market for trade claims post-Enron and KB Toys. 
																																																																																																																																
 1. See Richard K. Milin & Yitzhak Greenberg, More Clarity For Claims Traders: 
“Claim Washing” After KB Toys, 1 NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISOR 1 (Thomson Reuters), 
January 2014, at 7. 
 2. See Walter Benzija, Cloudy with a Chance of Disallowance: Does § 502(d) 
Inhere to the Claim or Claimant?, 33 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 14, *14 (Feb. 2014). 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 1. 
 7. See id. at 7. 
 8. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 9. In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 10. KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 249. 
 11. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 428. 
 12. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 9. 
 13. Id. at 7. 
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Part I of this paper provides a thorough overview of the process of 
filing a claim and the claims trading process. Additionally, Part I will 
begin to unravel the dilemma posed when claims are transferred 
throughout the claims administration process. Part II discusses key 
cases, in particular, KB Toys, Enron I and Enron II, which have made 
determinations as to whether claims that would be disallowed in the 
hands of an original claimant, would also be disallowed in the hands of 
subsequent transferees. Finally, Part III discusses the effects of Enron 
and KB Toys on the future of the claims trading market and provides a 
two-prong approach to mitigating the effects of Enron and KB Toys to 
the claims trading market. 
I. CLAIMS TRADING: AN OVERVIEW 
Part I begins with an overview of how claimants file proof of 
claims in a bankruptcy case. Next, this Part examines why claims may 
be disallowed and how the disallowance of claims poses a dilemma in 
the claims trading process. 
A. FILING A PROOF OF CLAIM 
When an individual or entity files for bankruptcy protection, 
especially in mega Chapter 11 cases14, creditors clamor to “claim” their 
right to what is left in the estate or may derived from the liquidation of 
assets.15 Pursuant to the debtor’s duties under the Bankruptcy Code, the 
debtor is required to file a schedule of assets and liabilities. 16  The 
schedule indicates which creditors the debtor believes it owes money 
																																																																																																																																
 14. Marshall S. Huebner & Elliot Moskowitz, The Prevalence and Utility of 
‘Roadmap’ Decisions in Bankruptcy Mega-Cases, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE, available at 
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/huebner.moskow.financier.worldwide.apr1
4.PDF (April 2014) (explaining that Mega Cases are Chapter 11 bankruptcies that 
“involve $100 million or more in assets, over 1000 entities and/or a high degree of 
public interest”). 
 15. See generally Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 3002 (Rule 
3002(c)(5) (referring to the “bar date” which is the date by which creditors must file a 
proof of claim; creditors are given at least 90 days notice of the bar date.). 
 16. 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012); see also Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure, Rule 1007(a). 
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and how much each is owed.17  Each creditor, whether listed on the 
schedule or not, is responsible for verifying the amount they are owed.18 
Creditors that are unlisted or believe their claim is incorrect on the 
schedule may file a proof of claim, representing the creditor’s right to 
payment.19 The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as a “right to payment, 
whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, 
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, 
undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”20 
As discussed in the Introduction, creditors trade their claims to 
other persons or entities willing to take on the uncertainty of payment on 
the claim.21 The claims discussed in this note will primarily refer to 
claims filed in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, as Chapter 11 bankruptcies 
are major venues for claims trading.22  Generally, Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code is utilized by businesses, such as corporations, sole 
proprietorships, and partnerships.23 
B. THE CLAIMS TRADING DILEMMA 
1. The Claims Trading Process 
Bankruptcy claims trading means exactly what it sounds like: “the 
buying and selling of claims against companies seeking relief under the 
Bankruptcy Code.” 24  Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure 3001(e), a creditor can sell this “right to payment” 25  to 
someone who is willing to enter an auction of illiquid assets.26 Although 
																																																																																																																																
 17. Id. 
 18. See Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 3001(a). 
 19. Id. 
 20. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2012). 
 21. Benzija, supra note 2, at *14. 
 22. Jeffrey N. Rich & Eric T. Moser, Bankruptcy Claims Trading: Basic Concepts, 
PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY, http://www.r3mlaw.com/Articles/Bankruptcy-Claims-
Trading-Basic-Concepts.pdf, 1 (last visited, Apr. 20, 2014). 
 23. U.S. COURTS, CHAPTER 11: REORGANIZATION UNDER THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, 
available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx. 
 24. Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 1. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Edward S Weisfelner, How Distressed Claims Trading May Impact Your 
Reorganization Strategy, in NAVIGATING TODAY’S ENVIRONMENT: THE DIRECTORS’ 
AND OFFICERS’ GUIDE TO RESTRUCTURING 1, 2 (Globe White Page ed., 2010) 
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various types of bankruptcy claims are traded on the market, this note 
will focus on trade claims.27 Trade claims are unsecured obligations of 
the debtor, generally held by the debtor’s vendors, suppliers, service 
providers, landlords, lawyers, unions and employees.28 Trade claims fall 
into three categories: general unsecured claims, priority claims, and 
unsecured claims with de facto priority.29 General unsecured claims are 
always the last to be paid; therefore, there is no guarantee they will be 
paid in full.30 On the other hand, priority claims must be paid in full, 
unless, the creditor waives full payment.31 
One of the biggest incentives for claim-holders to sell their claim is 
the financial relief correlated with discontinuing participation in the 
bankruptcy.32 If a creditor sells his claim, he no longer has to deal with 
the nuisance of following the bankruptcy or concerning himself with 
fighting for payment on his claim.33 The transferor can reduce his legal 
expenses for evaluating its claim and participating in the time-
consuming34 bankruptcy process.35 Thus, the key reason transferors sell 
claims is to receive a quicker or more certain realization on their claim.36 
Additionally, in the likely occurrence the claim is sold for a loss, 
the buyer can obtain a tax deduction.37 Claims are generally sold for 
much less than the value of the claim because of the risks associated 
																																																																																																																																
(explaining that SecondMarket is a platform for “illiquid assets” such as bankruptcy 
claims). 
 27. Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 1 (noting other types of claims traded on the 
market include secured claims and counterparty claims). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. See id. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 2.  
 33. Benzija, supra note 2, at *14. 
 34. Maureen Farrell, Lehman Bankruptcy Bill: $1.6 billion, CNN (March 6, 2012, 
4:06 pm). By March 2012, the fees for lawyers and consultants in the Lehman Brother’s 
bankruptcy were nearly $1.6 billion. The bankruptcy consulting firm, Alvarez & 
Marsal, has collected more than $512 million in fees since January 2012. The Debtor’s 
law firm, Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP is set to collect nearly $383 million and the 
firm representing the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors has already billed 
$133 million. 
 35. See Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 1. 
 36. Benzija, supra note 2, at *14. 
 37. Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 2. 
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with claims trading.38 However, the tax savings the business receives 
can marginally recoup this loss.39 
On the flipside, transferees acquire these claims in hope to collect a 
profit when the claim is paid.40 At first look, it seems reckless to buy a 
right to payment when payment isn’t guaranteed.41 However, aside from 
desire for profit, buyers often participate in the claims trading market in 
order to obtain a “controlling block” of claims within a particular claim 
category, allowing them to play a tremendous role in shaping the 
reorganization plan.42 This allows a transferee to gain leverage in the 
bankruptcy case and obtain equity in the reorganized company.43 
While the claims trading market seems like a nightmare to those 
who are risk-averse, it can be an extremely lucrative market. 44  The 
benefit of claims trading flows through the entire financial system.45 
Claims trading provides liquidity in an otherwise illiquid market. 46 
Because claims trading gives banks, insurance companies, trade 
creditors and other financial institutions an exit option, “lending 
institutions are apt to provide increased capital to borrowers.”47 In 2009, 
the claims trading market was approximately $500 billon.48 Although 
the number of bankruptcies has decreased tremendously since the 2008 
economic crisis, in 2012 the claims trading market was still valued at 
approximately $41 billion.49 
2. The Claims Trading Hypothetical 
Hypothetically, if Creditor A had received a preferential payment 
less than ninety days before Company X filed for bankruptcy, the 
Trustee would likely use its avoiding powers to recover the preferential 
																																																																																																																																
 38. Benzija, supra note 2, at *14. 
 39. See Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 6. 
 40. Benzija, supra note 2, at *14. 
 41. See discussion infra Part I.B.3. 
 42. See Weisfelner, supra note 26, at 3. 
 43. See Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 2. 
 44. See Benzija, supra note 2, at *14. 
 45. See Weisfelner, supra note 26, at 1. 
 46. Id. at 3. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 2. 
 49. See Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 1. 
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payment Creditor A received. 50  Until the preferential payment is 
returned to the estate, Creditor A may not receive payment on any of its 
allowed claims.51 Complications arise when Creditor A sells its claims 
to Creditor B, but does not return its preferential payment to the 
bankruptcy estate. The lack of clarity under the Bankruptcy Code, 
especially under Section 502(d), has led to cloudy approaches to 
determining whether Creditor B’s claim should be allowed.52 
3. Disallowance of Claims 
After a proof of claim has been filed, pursuant to Section 502 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, claims may be allowed or disallowed.53 While a claim 
may be allowed under Section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, it is not 
necessarily paid in the distribution of the estate. 54  In particular, 
unsecured claims are distributed by way of the level of priority under 
Section 507 of the Bankruptcy Code.55 Domestic support obligations are 
among the first to be paid, followed by administrative expenses.56 Thus, 
as the level of priority of a claim decreases, the risk of non-repayment 
on the claim increases.57 
																																																																																																																																
 50. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of 
an interest of the debtor in property . . . made on or within 90 days before the date of the 
filing of the petition . . . .”). 
 51. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012) (“[T]he court shall disallow any claim of any 
entity from which property is recoverable under section . . . 547 . . . of this title, unless 
such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or turned over any such property, for 
which such entity or transferee is liable . . . .”). 
 52. See id.; Benzija, supra note 2, at *14 (noting ambiguity in language of Section 
502(d)). 
 53. 11 U.S.C. § 502 (2012). 
 54. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2012). “The claims standing on the highest rung must be paid 
in full before any claims on the next rung can be paid anything.” See John D. Ayer, 
Michael L. Bernstein & Jonathan Friedland, Chapter 11—”101”, The Am. Bankr. Inst. 
J. (Feb. 24, 2004), available at http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/kirkexp/publications/ 
2392/Document1/Friedland_Priorities.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 55. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (unsecured claims have third level of priority). 
 56. Id. § 507(a)(1)–(2). 
 57. See Ayer, Bernstein & Friedland, supra note 54 (“[I]n many cases the priority 
claims will eat up the assets before we ever get to the residual non-priority class.”). 
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Among the many reasons a claim may be disallowed, including an 
untimely filing of the claim58 and unenforceability of the claim against 
the debtor,59 this note will focus on disallowance of claims pursuant to 
the Trustee’s power to avoid certain transfers outside the estate.60 The 
wrinkle in claims trading arises from these avoiding powers.61 
Section 547(b)(4)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code gives the Trustee 
power to avoid preferential payments made to creditors ninety days 
before the commencement of the case62 or unauthorized and fraudulent 
transfers of property of the estate two years prior to the filing of the 
bankruptcy petition.63 Pursuant to § 502(d), “the court shall disallow any 
claim from any entity from which property is recoverable” or that is a 
transferee of an avoidable transfer, unless the transferee has paid the 
avoidable amount, or turned over that property.64 
Section 502(d) creates a mechanism to deal with creditors who have 
possession of estate property on the bankruptcy petition date or are 
the recipients of pre- or post-bankruptcy asset transfers that can be 
avoided because they are fraudulent, preferential, unauthorized, or 
otherwise subject to forfeiture by operation of a bankruptcy trustee’s 
avoidance powers.65 
																																																																																																																																
 58. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(9) (2012) (“[T]he court, after notice and a hearing, shall 
determine the amount of such claim in lawful currency of the United States as of the 
date of the filing of the petition, and shall allow such claim in such amount, except to 
the extent that . . . proof of such claim is not timely filed . . . .”). 
 59. See id. § 502(b)(1). 
 60. See id. § 502(c). 
 61. See id. § 502(d) (2005); see also 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012). “[T]he cloud on the 
claim continues until the preference payment is returned, regardless of whether the 
person or entity holding the claim received the preference payment.” In re KB Toys 
Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 254 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 62. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) (2012) (“[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an 
interest of the debtor in property . . . made on or within 90 days before the date of the 
filing of the petition . . . .”). 
 63. Id. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2012) (“The trustee may avoid any transfer . . . if the debtor 
voluntarily or involuntarily made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual 
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or 
after the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred,  
indebted . . . .”). 
 64. Id. § 502(d). 
 65. Charles M. Oellerman & Mark G. Douglas, KB Toys: Hobgoblins Return to 
Haunt Bankruptcy Claims Traders, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS 1 (July/August 2012), 
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The motive of this section is to promote equality amongst creditors, 
so that entities cannot share in the distribution of the estate’s assets until 
they have returned recoverable property and avoidable transfers. 66 
However, it is unclear whether a subsequent transferee of a claim can 
collect on its claim, if the original transferor has not returned that 
preferential payment. 
a. Legislative History of Section 502(d) 
Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code is derived from Section 
57(g) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.67 Section 57(g) states “the claims 
of creditors who have received or acquired preferences, liens, 
conveyances, transfers, assignments or encumbrances, void or voidable 
under this title, shall not be allowed unless such creditors shall surrender 
such preferences, liens, conveyances, transfers, assignments, or 
encumbrances.”68 In order to determine whether the focus of Section 
502(d) was the claim or claimants, courts looked to how past courts 
interpreted the phrase “claims of creditors” in Section 57(g).69 If the 
focus of “claims of any creditor” was the claim, Section 57(g) would 
have permitted transferred claims to be disallowed.70 Alternatively, if 
the focus of the section was the claimants, disabilities would remain 
with the claimant and would not travel with the claim. Thus, a claim 
would only be disallowable in the hands of the original claimant.71 
While courts may look to legislative history of Section 502(d), it is 




 66. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012); Andrea Saavedra, Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy 
Code Permits Disallowance of Claims Transferred to Third Parties Where the 
Underlying Avoidance Action Remains Unresolved, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP 
BANKRUPTCY BULLETIN (June 2006). 
 67. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 254 n.9 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Other courts have 
recognized that section 57(g) is relevant to the interpretation of § 502(d).”); see In re 
LaRoche Indus., Inc., 284 B.R. 406, 409 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (examining a case 
interpreting section 57(g) when faced with an issue arising under § 502(d)). 
 68. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, §§ 212, 249 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 612, 649 
(1976)) (repealed Oct. 1, 1979). 
 69. Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 7. 
 70. See In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 71. Id. 
2015] IS CLAIMS TRADING A RISK OR AN ART? 507 
leaves open the question of what happens to trade claims in the hands of 
a subsequent or immediate transferee, when the trade claim would have 
been disallowed in the hands of the original claimant because of an 
avoidable preference or fraudulent conveyance: enter—In re KB Toys,72 
Enron I73 and Enron II.74 
b. Disallowance Under § 550 
Section 550 of the Bankruptcy Code is dedicated to the Trustee’s 
avoiding powers against immediate and mediate transferees of the 
property of the estate.75 In the context of claims trading, the original 
claimants would be the initial transferee, and all subsequent transferees 
would be immediate and mediate transferees. 76  In the hypothetical 
discussed in Part I.C.(a), Creditor B would be the immediate 
transferee.77 
Immediate and mediate transferees have an affirmative good faith 
defense if they took the transferred property for value, in good faith and 
without knowledge of the violability of the transfer.78 Unfortunately for 
claims traders, the courts have unilaterally held that Section 550 
provides a good faith defense to the transfer of property but not the 
transfer of a claim.79 Thus, the good faith defense of Section 550 is not 
applicable in the claims trading context.80 
																																																																																																																																
 72. Id. at 249. 
 73. In re Enron Corp. (Enron I), 340 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated 
and remanded, 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 74. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 425. 
 75. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2012). 
 76. See id. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. § 550(b)(1). 
 79. Enron I, 340 B.R. at 206 (“[A] claim as defined under [§] 101(5), is not, and 
has never been, considered property of the estate (it is being asserted against) under [§] 
541 of the Bankruptcy Code.”). 
 80. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 255 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that Section 550 
is not applicable to claims trading because the subsequent transferee did not purchase 
property of the estate). 
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II. CLAIMS TRADING CASE LAW 
Part II provides a deep recitation of the facts and court’s analysis in 
KB Toys, Enron I and Enron II. This section also provides an overview 
of older cases that view Section 502(d) with a different lens. 
A. KEY CLAIMS TRADING CASE LAW 
1. In re KB Toys 
a. The Facts 
Between April 7, 2004 and May 22, 2007, ASM Capital L.P and 
ASM Capital II LLP (“KB Transferees”), purchased nine claims (“KB 
Claims”) executed by Assignment Agreements from various trade 
creditors (“KB Original Claimants”).81 In line with standard practice of 
claims trading, four of the claims contained generic indemnification 
clauses.82 These indemnification clauses contained “provisions designed 
to protect [claim traders] from defects that [were] not readily known or 
knowable at the time of transfer.”83 In this case, the specific provisions 
shifted the risk of disallowance back to the KB Original Claimants by 
requiring them to pay restitution to KB Transferees if the KB Claim was 
deemed disallowed.84 
Prior to the KB Claim Transferee’s purchase of the claims, each 
KB Original Claimant was listed on the Statement of Financial Affairs 
(“SOFA”) as receiving a payment within ninety days of the petition 
date. 85  Because each KB Original Claimant had received preference 
payments, the trustee brought and obtained judgment on each preference 
action.86 All but one of the claims was purchased prior to the Trustee’s 
																																																																																																																																
 81. Id. at 250. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Benzija, supra note 2, at *14 (citing KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 250). 
 84. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 250. 
 85. Id. (“Each SOFA required the disclosure of all payments made within the 90 
days immediately preceding the Petition Date.”). 
 86. Id. 
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judgment on the preference actions.87 Unfortunately for the Trustee, the 
judgments in each preference action were not collectable because the 
KB Original Claimants went out of business.88 Thus, the Trustee sought 
to disallow the claims transferred to the KB Transferees.89 
b. The Court’s Analysis 
 “The Trustee contended that the [KB] Claims [were] disallowable 
under § 502(d) because each [KB] Original Claimant received a 
preference before transferring its Claim to [the KB Claim 
Transferees].” 90  The court outlined the process and factors it would 
consider to make its determination.91 First, the court turned to the text of 
the statute, noting that a textual analysis would call for the court to apply 
the text of the statute if the text is clear and unambiguous.92  If the 
statutory text was ambiguous, the court’s next step would be to look at 
the legislative history of the statute.93  While undertaking a statutory 
interpretation of § 502(d), the court would also look at the Bankruptcy 
Code holistically and consider all of the provisions of the Code.94 Lastly, 
and arguably more importantly, the court looked to the object and policy 
of the statute.95 
While sidestepping the question of whether the statute is clear and 
unambiguous, the Third Circuit began by finding the language of § 
502(d) rendered a whole category of claims disallowable—claims that 
had received avoidable transfers.96 Therefore, “‘any claim’ falling into 
																																																																																																																																
 87. Id. (noting KB Transferee’s purchased eight of the claims before the Trustee 
commenced preference actions and one was obtained after the Trustee obtained a 
judgment). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. (noting the Trustee did not seek to avoid the transfer, but rather to assert the 
claims were disallowed because the KB Original Claimants had received a preference). 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 251-54. 
 92. Id. at 251; see Roth v. Norfalco LLC, 651 F.3d 367, 379 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(holding if the text of the statute is plain, the Court’s inquiry ends). 
 93. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 251; see Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors of 
Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir 
2003) (“[Courts] must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but 
look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.”). 
 94. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 251; see Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 559. 
 95. Cybergenics, 330 F.3d at 559. 
 96. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 252. 
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this category of claims is disallowable until the avoidable transfer is 
returned.” 97  “Because the statute focuses on claims—and not 
claimants—claims that are disallowable under § 502(d) must be 
disallowed no matter who holds them.”98 Thus, the claim’s disallowance 
traveled with the claim and was not washed of its disallowance. 99 
Notably, the court refused to cite a distinction in the rule for claims that 
were sold, rather than assigned.100 
In looking to the legislative history of § 502(d) the Third Circuit 
looked to its past equivalent, § 57(g) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.101 
The court looked to Swarts v. Siegal to determine whether § 502(d) is 
consistent with past court’s interpretation of § 57(g).102 In Swarts, the 
court held that the “[t]he disqualification of a claim for allowance 
created by a preference inheres in and follows every part of the claim, 
whether retained by the original creditor or transferred to another, until 
the preference is surrendered.”103 Thus, the Third Circuit concluded the 
legislative history of § 502(d), namely § 57(g), was consistent with the 
Third Circuit’s interpretation of the law.104 
Additionally, in looking to the law’s “object and policy,”105  the 
Court in KB Toys cited policy objectives for its interpretation of the 
statute.106 If the court allowed original claimants to “wash” their claim 
of any disability by selling it, the original claimant would still receive 
value for a claim that would have otherwise been disallowed.107 If these 
																																																																																																																																
 97. See id. at 251-52. 
 98. Id. at 252. 
 99. Id. at 252-53. 
 100. Id. at 254 n.11 (“Enron II’s reliance on this supposed state law distinction may 
also be problematic for several reasons. First, the state law on which it relies does not 
provide a distinction between assignments and sales. Second, resort to state law in a 
bankruptcy case must be done with care.”). 
 101. Id. at 254. “The legislative history provides that § 502(d) is derived from 
present law, which, as the Bankruptcy Court noted, was section 57(g) of the Bankruptcy 
Act of 1898.” Id. at 253 (internal citation omitted). 
 102. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 253. 
 103. Id. (quoting Swarts v. Seigel, 117 F. 13, 15 (8th Cir. 1902)). 
 104. Id. (“[T]he case law interpreting section 57(g) is consistent with our 
interpretation of § 502(d).”). 
 105. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. 
Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery, 330 F.3d 548, 559 (3d Cir 2003). 
 106. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 252. 
 107. Id. 
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transferees were permitted to recover on their claim, the guaranteed 
consequence was less money for the estate to distribute to other 
creditors.108 If every claim could be washed of disability, every claimant 
with a claim subject to disallowance would transfer his or her claim,109 
undermining one of the aims of § 502(d).110 A large purpose of § 502(d) 
is to assist the Trustee in creditor compliance with judicial orders.111 
Once a judgment is issued with respect to a claim, § 502(d) compels 
claimants to return preferential payments as a condition of receiving 
payment on their claim. 112  However, if the claim is washed of any 
disability after it’s transferred, the Trustee’s power to disallow 
problematic claims is rendered useless.113 
2. Enron I and II 
a. The Facts 
Prior to filing for bankruptcy protection, Enron entered into short-
term credit agreements with several banks.114 At various points after the 
Enron bankruptcy filing, Citibank and other syndicate banks, transferred 
claims to parties such as Deutsche Bank via a Purchase and Sale 
Agreement and an Assignment and Acceptance.115 Additionally, claims 
were transferred to Avenue Special Situations Fund II, LP (“Avenue”), 
DK Acquisition Partners, LP (“DK”), RCG Carpathia Master Fund Ltd. 
(“RCG”), Rushmore Capital–I, LLC (“Rushmore I”) and Rushmore 
Capital–II, LLC (“Rushmore II”) (collectively, the “Enron 
Transferees”).116 Specifically, on February 22, 2002, a claims transfer 
(“Enron Claims”) was made from Citibank to Deutsche Bank.117 On 
																																																																																																																																
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. “The twin aims of the section 502(d) are ‘to assure an equality of 
distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy estate’ and ‘to have the coercive effect of 
insuring compliance with judicial orders.” In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 
435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing In re Davis, 889 F.2d 658, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1989). 
 111. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 112. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012). 
 113. In re KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 252. 
 114. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 428. 
 115. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 428-29. 
 116. In re Enron Corp. (Enron I), 340 B.R. 180, 185 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), 
vacated and remanded, 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 117. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 429. 
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May 15, 2002, Deutsche Bank transferred its Enron claims to 
Springfield through a Purchase and Sale Agreement.118 Most of these 
transfers included general indemnity clauses protecting the transferor in 
an event the claim receives less favorable treatment.119 
On September 24, 2003, Enron filed an action in the Bankruptcy 
Court for “disallowance of the transferors’ claims under section 502(d) 
of the Bankruptcy Code based on allegations that the transferors 
received and failed to repay certain avoidable transfers[,]” along with 
several other claims for equitable subordination and compensatory and 
punitive damages.120 
b. Enron I 
The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York found 
that a claim disallowable in the hands of an original claimant could be 
equally disallowable in the hands of a subsequent transferee.121  The 
Bankruptcy Court noted the lack of case law on this issue but “where an 
entity, subject to an avoidance action, holds a claim—a right to payment 
or remedy—against the debtor and transfers such claim, the section 
502(d) disallowance applies to the transferred claim unless and until the 
amount owed to the estate as a result of the avoidance action is received 
by the bankrupt estate.122 Thus, the “identity of the holder of a claim is 
irrelevant when the estate takes action against such claim under section 
502(d) because ‘[t]he claim and the defense to the claim under section 
502(d) cannot be altered by the claimant’s subsequent assignment of the 
claim to another entity . . . that has not received an avoidable 
transfer.’”123 
																																																																																																																																
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 428. 
 120. Id. at 429. 
 121. Enron I, 340 B.R. at 183. 
 122. Id. at 194-95 (“The Court has not found any case law mandating that the 
creditor who received an avoidable transfer be the same entity that actually asserts such 
claim against the debtor in the bankruptcy proceeding in order for a debtor to assert a 
section 502(d) disallowance against such claim.”). 
 123. Id. at 195 (quoting In re Metiom, Inc., 301 B.R. 634, 642-43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2003)). 
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The Bankruptcy Court also factored policy considerations for its 
finding that claims could not simply be washed of their disabilities.124 
The Court sought to prevent creditors from transferring their claims to 
wash them of disability.125 Allowing claim washing would eviscerate the 
meaning of § 502(d) because entities that received voidable transfers 
could share in the distribution, even indirectly, without returning 
preferences and fraudulent conveyances.126 
c. Enron II 
In Enron II127, the District Court overturned the Bankruptcy Court’s 
ruling in Enron I. The District Court began its analysis by looking at the 
plain language of § 502(d). 128  The Court highlighted that § 502(d) 
requires disallowance of “any claim of any entity from which property is 
recoverable . . . or that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable . . . unless 
such entity or transferee has paid that amount, or turned over any such 
property, for which such entity or transferee is liable.”129  The court 
deduced that the plain language focused on the claimant, referenced as 
the entity or transferee in the statute, and not on the claim itself.130 Thus, 
disallowance is a “personal disability” that attaches to the claimant and 
not an attribute of the claim itself.131 
The Court supported its analysis by citing the opportunistic purpose 
of § 502(d).132 Section 502(d) gives creditors a chance to collect on their 
claim, even if they received a preference or fraudulent conveyance.133 
However, this opportunity is only available if the claimant surrenders 
any fraudulent or preferential transfers.134 The Court insinuated that this 
																																																																																																																																
 124. Enron I, 340 B.R. at 199-205. 
 125. Id. at 199-202 (“One of the consequences would be to encourage the creditors 
to ‘wash’ the claims free of any possibility of disallowance by simply transferring 
them.”). 
 126. Id. at 201. 
 127. In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 128. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 431-32. 
 129. Id. at 443 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012)) (emphasis added). 
 130. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 443 (“The plain language of section 502(d) focuses on 
the claimant as opposed to the claim and leads to the inexorable conclusion that 
disallowance is a personal disability of a claimant, not an attribute of the claim.”). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012). 
 134. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 443. 
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purpose of § 502(d) would not be served if the attribute of disallowance 
attached to the claim because the subsequent transferee never received 
the preference to begin with.135 Thus, the statute would be punitive and 
would require transferee’s to surrender something they do not have, 
namely the avoidable assets.136 
The court extended its analysis by distinguishing between the 
assignment and sale of claims and the legal consequences of each type 
of transfer. 137  An assignment is “a contractual transfer of a right, 
interest, or claim from one person to another.”138 An assignee “stands in 
the shoes of the assignor”139 and assumes any attached limitations if the 
claim was in the hands of the assignor.140 Theoretically, an assignee 
cannot get more than an assignor has because in an assignment the 
assignor and assignee swap places.141 On the other hand, when a claim is 
sold, a purchaser does not necessarily take on all of the rights of the 
seller. 142  Further, a purchaser cannot stand in the shoes of a seller 
because theoretically the purchaser can obtain more than the transferor 
had.143 
Moreover, the court analyzed whether transferred claims derived 
the “personal disabilities” of the original claimant. 144  The court 
determined that disallowance is a personal attribute that belonged to the 
claimant and not the claim itself.145 Thus, sales of claims do not transfer 
																																																																																																																																
 135. See id. at 435, 445 (“This is a question of allocating the burden and risk of 
pursuing the bad actor transferor between two groups of innocents: the creditors as a 
whole or the transferee.”). 
 136. Id. at 443. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Goldie v. Cox, 130 F.2d 695, 720 (8th Cir. 1942). 
 140. Caribbean S.S. Co., S.A. v. Sonmez Denizcilik Ve Ticaret A.S., 598 F.2d 1264, 
1266–67 (2d Cir. 1979). 
 141. See Fleet Capital Corp. v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., No. 01 Civ. 1047, 
(AJP), 2002 WL 31174470, at *32 n.39 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2002) (citing BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)). 
 142. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 435-36. 
 143. Id. at 435. 
 144. Id. at 443. 
 145. Id. (“Where a claimant has purchased its claim, as opposed to receiving it by 
assignment, operation of law, or subrogation, assignment law principles have no 
application with respect to personal disabilities of claimants. Thus, purchasers are 
protected from being subject to the personal disabilities of their sellers.”). 
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the personal attributes of the claimant to the buyer.146 However, when 
the original claimant transfers the claim via assignment, the transferor 
steps into the shoes of the original claimant and assumes his personal 
disabilities.147 
3. Effect of Enron II: In re Longacre 
Indemnification clauses play a crucial role in the claims trading 
process.148 This is clearly evident in the litigation that took place within 
the Delphi Automotive Systems bankruptcy, Longacre Master Fund Ltd. 
v. ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc.149 In Longacre, the original 
claimant, ATS Automation Tooling Systems Inc., sold its $2.14 million 
claim to Longacre for eighty-nine cents on the dollar. 150  Although 
unsecured claims occasionally don’t get paid at all, the high purchase 
price was justified because the claim was expected to be paid in full.151 
The indemnification provision in the transfer agreement provided 
the transferor would repay the transferee “an amount equal to the 
portion of the Minimum Claim Amount subject to the Impairment 
multiplied by the Purchase Rate . . . , plus interest thereon at 10% per 
annum from the date hereof to the date of repayment” if the claim was 
“offset, objected to, disallowed, subordinated, in whole or in part.”152 
Essentially, the provision would kick in if the claim was impaired and 
the issue was not resolved within 180 days.153 
Within ninety days of the bankruptcy filing, Delphi filed a claims 
objection in order to reserve its right to disallow the claim.154 As it 
																																																																																																																																
 146. Id. at 442. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See Rich & Moser, supra note 22, at 4 (“A seller should be wary of selling its 
claims if it knows that it has exposure for an avoidance action, such as a preference, 
because that exposure is likely to trigger a future indemnification claim by the buyer 
and may defeat the purpose of selling the claim.”). 
 149. Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Sys. Inc. (Longacre 
II), 496 F. App’x 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 150. Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Sys. Inc. (Longacre 
I), 456 B.R. 633, 637, 636 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) vacated in part, 496 F. App’x 135 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
 151. Id. at 636 (noting the First Plan provided for full payment on all unsecured 
claims). 
 152. Longacre I, 456 B.R. at 637. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id. 
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turned out, ATS had made a $17.3 million payment to Delphi within the 
ninety days prior to the bankruptcy filing.155 Therefore, prior to selling 
its claim, ATS knew its claim could have been disallowed because of its 
preference payment.156 
When the indemnification provision kicked in, the interest at ten 
percent per annum alone equaled $762,811.35.157 If the provision was 
enforced, the transferee would have to pay the transferor approximately 
$2.67 million, about $500,000 more than the original filed claim 
amount.158 Although Delphi eventually withdrew its objection, the buyer 
of the claim requested $817,037.17, calculated as the interest accruing at 
ten percent per annum on the purchase price from the date of the claim-
purchase agreement to the withdrawal of the claims objection and 
dismissal of the adversary proceeding.159 
The District Court considered whether the claim objection 
constituted an impairment of the claim or was simply a reservation of 
rights.160 If the claim objection impaired the claim, the indemnification 
clause in the transfer agreement would kick in.161 The District Court 
looked to Enron to determine whether the transfer constituted a sale or 
assignment, as the distinction was crucial to interpreting the transfer 
agreement. 162  The District Court found that because the transfer 
agreement limited the transferee’s rights to those “necessary to support 
or enforce the [c]laim[,]”163 and left defense rights with the seller, it 
must be a sale.164 The Court noted, “a creditor retains preference liability 
if it sells its bankruptcy claim, but passes such liability if it assigns the 
																																																																																																																																
 155. Id. at 637. 
 156. See id. 
 157. Id. at 639. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 639. 
 160. Id. at 640 (“The Adversary Proceeding having been dismissed, no vehicle 
exists through which such an objection could be raised, filed, or formally commenced 
in the future.”). 
 161. See id. (Under the Transfer Agreement a claim “objected to” or made subject to 
offset” would be considered impaired. However, “[n]o section 502(d) objection ha[d] 
been actually raised, filed, or formally commenced against the Claim.”). 
 162. Id. at 640. 
 163. Id. 
 164. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: An Update on Case Law Interpreting 
Transferee Liability in the Trading Market, LATHAM & WATKINS BUY-SIDE BRIEFS 
(Oct. 19, 2012) [hereinafter BUY SIDE BRIEFS]. 
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claim.”165 “A ‘pure assignment’ would leave no retained rights with the 
seller”166 because an assignment would put the transferee in the shoes of 
the transferor.167 Thus, no impairment on the claim was possible because 
there was no assignment and under Enron II the claim was washed of § 
502(d) disallowance.168 Additionally, the court found the objection was a 
reservation of rights, rather than a true objection to the claim.169 
The Second Circuit reviewed the District Court’s ruling de novo 
and determined the claim was impaired by the claims objection. 170 
“Thus, even if the objection was in effect only a reservation of rights 
rather than an objection they intended to pursue immediately, it still 
constituted an objection under the purchase agreement.”171 The court 
noted that once the claim was objected to, it could not be deemed 
allowed.172 Thus, if the claim was no longer deemed allowed, it was 
clearly impaired.173 
Additionally, the Second Circuit indirectly called into question 
Enron’s sale/assignment dichotomy but left the law unchanged.174 The 
Second Circuit rejected the District Court’s conclusion that the claim 
transfer was a sale, rather than an assignment.175 The court held that the 
transfer agreement “strongly suggest[ed] that it was an assignment” 
because it was “(i) titled an ‘Assignment of Claim’; (ii) included 
language stating the agreement ‘unconditionally sells, transfers, and 
																																																																																																																																
 165. J.R. Smith & Justin F. Paget, Selling A Bankruptcy Claim Understanding 
Repurchase Provisions, 32 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32, 32 (2013) (citing In re Enron Corp. 
(Enron II), 379 B.R. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)). 
 166. BUY-SIDE BRIEFS, supra note 164. 
 167. In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 442-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 168. See id. at 443-44. 
 169. Longacre I, 456 B.R. at 637. 
 170. Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Sys. Inc. (Longacre 
II), 496 F. App’x 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Longacre II, 496 F. App’x at 138 (“[E]ven if the objection was in effect only a 
reservation of rights rather than an objection they intended to pursue immediately, it 
still constituted an objection under the purchase agreement.”). 
 173. See id. (The Court found that Delphi’s objection clearly fell into the purchase 
agreement’s definition of impairment, which occurred when “all or any part of the 
Claim is . . . objected to . . . in whole or in part . . . .”). 
 174. Id. at 139 (noting the transfer contract included both the terms assignment and 
sale). 
 175. Id. 
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assigns’; and (iii) the agreement says the parties recognize ‘this 
assignment of claim as [an] unconditional assignment[.]’”176 
B. OTHER RELEVANT CLAIMS TRADING CASES 
Below is a brief explanation of the facts and determinations of 
cases that guided the courts in KB Toys, Enron I and Enron II. 
1. In re Wood & Locker 
The facts of In re Wood & Locker, Inc.177 are similar to those of 
Enron and KB Toys. Original claimants, William-Patterson (“Wood & 
Locker Original Claimants”) transferred its claims to InterFirst Bank 
Dallas (“Wood & Locker Transferees”).178 However, the debtor, Wood 
& Locker, initiated a preference action against the Wood & Locker 
Original Claimants, halting the Wood & Locker Transferee’s 
entitlement to any distributions.179 The court asserted if there was no 
liability under the enumerated sections of § 502(d), it would not be 
triggered. 180  The avoidance action was triggered to recover property 
from Wood & Locker Original Claimants and not the Wood & Locker 
Transferees. 181  Hence, the Wood & Locker Transferees were third 
parties that were not the “kind of creditor” the trustee could recover 
property from.182 Therefore, because the original claimant was liable 
under § 502(d) and not the transferee, the court found the disallowance 
provision was not triggered.183 
																																																																																																																																
 176. BUY-SIDE BRIEFS, supra note 164 (citing Longacre II, 496 F. App’x at 139). 
 177. In re Wood & Locker, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19501 (W.D. Tex. June 17, 
1988). 
 178. Id. at *2. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at *7-8. 
 181. Id. at *4-5 
 182. Id. at *8-9. 
 183. Id. 
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2. In re Metiom 
In In re Metiom, 184  both the original claimant and subsequent 
transferee filed for bankruptcy protection. 185  The court found the 
transferee was subject to all of the equities and burdens that attached to 
the property.186 Further, the disallowance of a claim created from one 
creditor followed to subsequent transferors until the preference is 
returned back to the estate.187 
III. EFFECTS AND EVOLUTION OF THE CLAIMS TRADING MARKET 
Part III begins with a synthesis of the court’s holding in KB Toys 
and Enron II. Next, this section discusses the effect of the holdings in 
KB Toys and Enron II on the claims trading market. Lastly, this section 
provides a two-prong solution to the claims trading dilemma. 
A. SYNTHESIS OF APPROACHES IN KB TOYS AND ENRON II 
There are several fundamental differences between the conclusions 
in KB Toys and Enron that will ultimately have important ramifications 
for claims traders. 188  First, it’s important to note that Enron II’s 
jurisdictional hook is limited to the Southern District of New York, as it 
was never appealed to the Second Circuit.189 However, KB Toys was 
appealed to the Third Circuit, which marked the first Court of Appeals 
determination on this matter.190 
The first disagreement between Enron and KB Toys was whether 
disallowance traveled with a claim or claimant.191 In Enron, the Court 
found that the statutory construct of § 502(d) articulated that 
disallowance was a personal attribute that attached to the claimant, 
																																																																																																																																
 184. In re Metiom, Inc., 301 B.R. 634 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 643 (emphasis added). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 9. 
 189. See id. at 2. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id.; In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) 
(noting focus of Section 502(d) was the claimant). But see In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 
247, 251-52 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining that Section 502(d) focused on a category of 
claims and not the claimant). 
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rather than a claim.192 On the other hand, the court in KB Toys asserted 
that § 502(d) intended to apply to a category of claims that would be 
disallowed.193 Thus, under KB Toys a claim could not be washed of 
disallowance regardless of who held the claim.194 In Wood & Locker, 
unlike KB Toys but like Enron, the Court determined the focus of 
Section 502(d) was the claimant and not the claim.195 However, unlike 
Enron, the Court in Wood & Locker found the Trustee’s avoiding 
powers did not extend to subsequent transferees.196 It is important to 
note that Wood & Locker was decided twenty-five years before KB 
Toys, and perhaps the policy issues discussed in KB Toys were not as 
prevalent in the late 1980s.197 
Second, in Enron the court found the treatment of the disallowance 
of claims depended on whether the claims were sold or assigned,198 
while KB Toys did not make this distinction. 199  Under the Enron 
approach, disallowance only transfers to the subsequent transferee if the 
transfer is made via assignment.200 However, as previously discussed,201 
KB Toys’ analysis follows that because attributes of the claim would 
travel with the claim and not the claimant, a claim disallowable in the 
hands of the original claimant would be disallowed irrespective of who 
held the claim.202 Thus, under KB Toys the type of transfer, whether via 
sale or assignment, would be of no relevance.203 
																																																																																																																																
 192. Enron II, 379 B.R. at 443. 
 193. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d at 251-52. 
 194. Id. at 252. 
 195. Compare In re Wood & Locker, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19501, at *8 
(W.D. Tex. June 17, 1988) (explaining that because the focus of Section 502(d) was the 
claimant, the power to avoid the claim did not travel with the claim, but rather stayed 
with the claimant), with Enron II, 379 B.R. at 439 (holding that disallowance is a 
personal disability that does not “inhere in the claim”). 
 196. Id. 
 197. See generally Aaron L. Hammer & Michael A. Brandess, Claims Trading: The 
Wild West of Chapter 11s, 29 Am. Bankr. Inst. J. 61, 64 (July/August 2010) (noting the 
increased complexities of Chapter 11 bankruptcy since 2007). 
 198. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d at 252. 
 199. In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 435 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 200. Id. 
 201. See discussion supra Part II.A.1.b. 
 202. KB Toys, 736 F.3d at 251-52. 
 203. Id. at 254 n.11 (noting “the state law on which [Enron II] relies [on] does not 
provide a distinction between assignments and sales”). 
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Lastly, in KB Toys the court narrowed its scope to trade claims,204 
while the court in Enron sought to expand its reach.205 This seemed to 
insinuate the court’s analysis under Enron would be uniform for all 
types of claims.206 KB Toys’ restricted scope could also limit its effect on 
future claims trading cases.207 
B. THE NOT-SO-GOOD GOOD FAITH DEFENSE 
Section 550(b)208 of the Bankruptcy Code provides an important 
caveat to the Trustee’s avoiding powers under Section 550(a).209  As 
discussed above, 210  the Section 550(b) good faith defense limits the 
Trustee’s avoiding powers when the transfer of property was made 
without the transferee’s knowledge of the voidable nature of the 
property or in otherwise good faith.211 
The subsequent transferees in both Enron and KB Toys attempted to 
assert a good faith defense.212 The courts looked to the clear language of 
the statute, which protects a good faith transferee who purchases 
property of the estate that is avoidable by the Trustee.213 As discussed in 
Part I.B(c)(ii), because the good faith defense applies to purchases of 
property of the estate and not claims, this defense was inapplicable.214 
																																																																																																																																
 204. Id. at 251. 
 205. In re Enron Corp. (Enron II), 379 B.R. 425, 428 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2007 (“[N]o 
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 206. Id. (noting “All the post-petition transferees assume the risk” of subordination 
and disallowance). 
 207. See Milin & Greenberg, supra note 1, at 9 (“[KB Toys’] decision’s full 
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 208. 11 U.S.C. § 550(b) (2012). 
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 212. In re KB Toys Inc., 736 F.3d 247, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2013); In re Enron Corp. 
(Enron I), 340 B.R. 180, 184 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated and remanded, 379 B.R. 
425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
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C. EFFECTS OF KB TOYS AND ENRON 
1. Case Study of Lehman Brothers 
On September 15, 2008, the world changed as the fourth-largest 
bank on Wall Street at the time filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection.215 The Lehman Brothers Bankruptcy was approximately six 
times larger than any United States Bankruptcy 216  and involved 
hundreds of thousands of creditors worldwide.217 While it is no secret 
the Lehman Bankruptcy triggered a global financial crisis,218 it seems 
almost counterintuitive that within the folds of disaster, there existed a 
multi-billion dollar market for claims trading.219 
As of March 2014, Lehman Brothers distributed approximately 
$80.4 billion to its creditors since it emerged from bankruptcy. 220 
Creditors obtained approximately 26.9 cents on the dollar on their 
claims. 221  Approximately two-thirds of Lehman’s $80.4 billion 
distributions, or approximately $53.6 billion, went to third-party 
creditors.222 
Although the bankruptcy process has streamlined over the years, it 
took almost four years for the company to emerge from bankruptcy.223 
Creditors who did not want to stick around to see through their claims 
																																																																																																																																
 215. Jonathan Stempel, Lehman Payout Tops $80 Billion, Creditors Get Another 
$17.9 Billion, REUTERS (Mar. 27, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/27/us-
lehman-bankruptcy-idUSBREA2Q1DD20140327. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Voluntary Petition for Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings Inc. et al., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), ECF No. 1; Christopher 
Scinta & Linda Sandler, Lehman Facing More Than 16,000 Creditors’ Claims, 
Bloomberg (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (September 23, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com 
/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aR9y3xb3PdNw. 
 218. Scinta & Sandler, supra note 217. 
 219. Kelly Bit & Lisa Abromowicz, Hedge Funds Get Fat on Lehman’s Remains, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 22, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/printer/ 
articles/202584-hedge-funds-get-fat-on-lehmans-remains. 
 220. Stempel, supra note 215. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. (noting Lehman Brothers filed petitions for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection on September 15, 2008 and the plan for reorganization became effective on 
March 12, 2012). 
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sold early on and distressed-investing hedge funds were eager to 
purchase those claims.224 For example, Paulson & Co. invested over $4 
billion in claims and has already profited over $1 billion after initial 
distributions.225 
Companies like Paulson & Co. did not blindly invest billions of 
dollars.226 After reviewing Lehman’s corporate documents to identify 
valuable assets that could be purchased at a discount, Paulson invested 
in the claims trading market. 227  However, even with their extensive 
research, they risked billions of dollars on claims that had the potential 
of being avoided by the Trustee.228 Furthermore, some indemnification 
clauses with the original claimants didn’t protect investors from 
investments in claims that could be avoided by the Trustee.229 
2. Less Benefits for Claim Traders 
Now that courts are beginning to establish the disallowance of 
claims in the hands of subsequent transferees, the benefits of claim 
trading tend to be less clear.230 Original claimants, who want to sell their 
claims and separate themselves from the time and cost of a lengthy 
bankruptcy proceeding, still run the risk of being pulled back into the 
process.231 Additionally, this involvement leads to litigation costs that 
were unseen at early stage of claims trading.232 
As demonstrated by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the claims 
distribution process of billions of dollars in claims can take years.233 
Investors like Paulson & Co. who risk billions of dollars in transferred 
claims may think twice about investing billions in claims that could 
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eventually be disallowed.234 Some investors may walk the line because 
the law is still unclear, while others may back off at the prospect of a 
surefire way to lose billions of dollars.235 
If Paulson & Co. had invested in Lehman’s claim trading market 
Post-KB Toys in the Delaware Bankruptcy Court, it is less likely they 
would have invested $4 billion.236 Investors are more likely to be wary 
of investing in trade claims under a KB Toys jurisdiction rather than the 
Enron court’s approach.237 Under Enron’s current approach investors 
like Paulson & Co. could skirt around the rule by transferring claims 
through a sale, rather than assignment.238 However, claims trading of 
non-trade claims are likely to fare worse under an Enron jurisdiction 
because the court did not narrow its analysis to a specific type of 
claim.239 Luckily for Paulson & Co., Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy was 
filed in the same jurisdiction as Enron, the Southern District of New 
York.240 
3. Sale/Assignment Distinction in Future Transfer Agreements 
Enron’s disparate treatment between claims sold and claims 
transferred via assignment generated confusion for all parties involved, 
including courts. 241  While the court defined assignment, 242  it didn’t 
particularly define what a sale was but rather harped on what it wasn’t—
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 240. Notice of Effective Date and Distribution Date at 1, In re Lehman Brothers 
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an assignment.243 While this may be troubling to most, it is also an 
opportunity for investors and transferors to take advantage of the 
caveat.244 However, it is likely courts will catch up and this technical 
runaround and the sale/assignment distinction will be litigated in the 
future.245 
As clearly demonstrated by Longacre, the dichotomy between sale 
and assignment created by Enron II 246  does not exist in real-life 
practice.247 In many cases sale contracts “speak of the seller ‘selling 
transferring and assigning’ the assets at issue.’” 248  While Enron 
delineated the different legal effects of a sale and assignment, the court 
gave little guidance on how to determine whether a transfer agreement is 
a sale or assignment.249 
Additionally, this dichotomy seems to imply the sale/assignment 
distinction is a technicality that can be overcome by a carefully drafted 
transfer agreement. 250  Transferee’s will be careful to create transfer 
agreements that attempt to indicate the claim was transferred via a sale, 
rather than an assignment.251 
D. SOLUTION TO THE CLAIMS TRADING DILEMMA: TWO PRONG 
APPROACH 
While there is no neatly packaged solution to the claims trading 
dilemma caused by KB Toys and Enron, there are ways to calm the 
																																																																																																																																
 243. Id. at 435-36 (“Assignment law principles do not apply to sales.”). 
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anxiety of claim traders.252 In this two-prong approach, the first prong 
calls for claims traders to heavily negotiate, repurchase provisions and 
recourse actions, as to limit the damning effect if the Trustee avoids the 
claim.253 The second prong calls for the creditor’s committee to play a 
more active role in facilitating the claims trading market.254 
1. Prong 1: Heavily Negotiated Repurchase Provisions and Recourse 
Actions 
Most claim-purchase and assignment agreements include a 
repurchase agreement. 255  Claimants hesitate to agree to such clauses 
because it keeps them tethered to the bankruptcy case, essentially 
nulling their purpose for selling the claim in the first place.256 Thus, 
these agreements are heavily negotiated prior to a transfer.257 
Repurchase provisions and recourse actions provide for 
reimbursement in the event a claim is reduced, subordinated or even 
disallowed.258 In particular, repurchase agreements require the original 
claimant to buy back all or some part of the claim.259 Some provisions of 
repurchase agreements and recourse actions automatically kick in when 
a claims objection is filed while others kick in after the claim is 
litigated.260 In addition to repayment of the claim, these provisions call 
for the transferor to pay interest from the date of the claim sale through 
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the date that the repurchase provision was triggered to cover the cost of 
capital, at a rate sometimes as high as ten percent per annum.261 
In the wake of Enron, KB Toys and Longacre, claimants in cases 
pending in the Southern District of New York and Third Circuit should 
pay close attention to the repurchase clauses in their transfer 
agreements.262 While transferee’s should seek to reduce their exposure, 
even original claimants should be concerned with doing their due 
diligence prior to selling or assigning their claims.263 In Longacre, the 
original claimholder would have faced paying over $500,000 in excess 
of what they sold the claim for if Delphi had not withdrawn its 
objection. 264  Even when Delphi withdrew the claims objection, the 
transferee requested $817,000 in interest from the transferor. 265  The 
transferor could have hedged that risk by putting different terms in their 




 261. Id. 
 262. Oellerman & Douglas, supra note 65, at 5-6. 
 263. Smith & Paget, supra note 165, at 32. 
 264. Id. at 33. 
 265. Longacre Master Fund, Ltd. v. ATS Automation Tooling Sys. Inc. (Longacre 
I), 456 B.R. 633, 639 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), vacated in part, 496 F. App’x 135 (2d Cir. 
2012) (noting the $817,000 excess was calculated as the 10% interest from the date of 
the Assignment agreement, December 14, 2011, until the allowance of the Claim on 
March 30, 2011.). 
 266. Smith & Paget, supra note 165, at 33 (showing it was irrefutable that the 
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preference action would be irrelevant because any resulting obligation would be a 
personal disability retained by ATS.”). 
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2. Prong 2: Using the Creditor’s Committee to Encourage Claims 
Trading 
Section 1102(a) of the Bankruptcy Code charges the United States 
Trustee with the duty to organize and appoint a committee of creditors 
with unsecured claims in Chapter 11 cases.267 The creditor’s committee 
(the “Committee”) is instrumental in investigating the financial state of 
the debtor, proposing a plan and, most importantly, the administration of 
the claimant’s unsecured claims. 268  The Committee is invaluable in 
complex reorganizations, which as discussed in this note are venues for 
heavy claims trading.269 
The heart of the Committee’s role in administering the claims 
reconciliation process is maximizing the amount each creditor is paid on 
their claim. 270  The value of a claim in the claims trading market 
increases with the likelihood of full payment on the claim.271 Creditors’ 
Committees serve their constituents by either working to approve a plan 
that provides for high payoffs or helping claim holders find “immediate 
exit opportunities.” 272 Thus, arguably an efficient claims trading market 
is part of the Committee’s duties.273 
The wrinkle in claims trading created by KB Toys and Enron 
makes the Committee’s job that much tougher.274 Nonetheless, there are 
ways a Committee can iron out some of the issues presented to all 
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players in the claims trading market.275 Encouraging Committees to play 
a more active role in the claims trading market can counter and even 
reduce the complications associated with claims trading and potential 
avoidance actions.276 Most broadly, the Committee can be used as a 
platform to encourage creditors to engage in the claims trading 
market.277 The more confident a transferee is in the Committee’s ability 
to maximize payment on a claim, the more likely the transferee will pay 
handsomely for purchase claims.278 
One of the many ways Committee’s can facilitate claims trading is 
“informing claimholders of the possibilities of claim purchases” and 
posting available claim trade prices. 279  Providing claim traders with 
information about previous claim purchases can assist transferors in 
evaluating the value of their claim.280 This posting process may also help 
match claim sellers with purchasers, as certain transferees listed in the 
posting may be looking to purchase more claims.281 
Creditors can also assist the claims trading process by posting about 
issues in the market.282 From 1983 to 1991, Rule 3001(e) “required not 
only that parties transferring claims inform the court that a transfer of 
claims was taking place, but also that they disclose the consideration 
paid for the transferred claims.”283 The challenges to claims trading at 
that time centered around the availability and access of adequate 
information to enable transferees and transferors to make an informed 
decision on the claim.284 Additionally, Courts utilized this information 
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when approving claim transfers.285 The amendment to Rule 3001(e) in 
1991, eliminating disclosure requirements in claims trading has 
inevitably led to less protection for unsophisticated creditors.286 While 
mandatory disclosures come with their own set of problems, disclosure 
of ongoing claims trading in a case by the Creditor’s Committee will 
inevitably lead to increased transparency regarding the value and 
disabilities of claims. 287  However, “[while] increased disclosure 
mandates would provide greater protections for unsophisticated 
creditors attempting to sell their claims, such regulations would detract 
from many of the profitable opportunities currently enjoyed.”288 
CONCLUSION 
The future of claims trading remains to be seen following the 
decisions in Enron and KB Toys. It is still unclear whether a claim that 
has been disallowed in the hands of the original claimants should be 
disallowed in the hand of a subsequent transferee.289 Enron jurisdictions 
will continue to differentiate these claims based on whether the claim 
was transferred through a purchase-sale agreement or via assignment.290 
Even if courts clarify Enron’s confusing sale/assignment distinction, the 
fact remains that under Enron the disallowance of a claim is a personal 
attribute of the claimant that travels with the claimant.291 In contrast, the 
KB Toys approach finds a disallowable claim in the hands of an original 
claimant is equally disallowable in the hands of a subsequent transferee 
because the disability follows the claim.292 
Developing a solution and providing increased clarity in the fate of 
claims trading is important, as claims’ trading is a multi-billion dollar 
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market, which creates liquidity in the marketplace.293 In the meantime, 
investors and creditors who seek to participate in the claims trading 
process should follow the two-pronged approach. Heavily negotiated 
indemnification agreements and recourse actions coupled with the 
Creditors Committee’s facilitation of the claims trading process will 
mitigate some of the risk of claims trading.294 
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